Coulter, Jeff, 1977, “Transparency of Mind,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 7: 321-350.
Gilbert Ryle, however, effectively demonstrated that understandingcannot be an activity (and a fortiori not an activity of 'the mind')because to understand, to have understanding, is an achievement.(323)
 Coulter, Jeff, 1979, The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethonomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy, London: Macmillan.（＝1998，西阪仰訳『心の社会的構成』新曜社．）
■参照文献→“Thinking and Reflecting,”“The Thinking of Thoughts”
 Coulter, Jeff, 1982, “Theoretical Problem of Cognitive Science,” Inquiry 25(1): 3-26.
My general view is that we consign thisterritory to cognitive psychology because we fail to appreciate the degreeto which this enterprise is wedded (perhaps necessarily) to logically inappropriatehypostatizations of the 'mental'; the theoretical de-reification of the field opens up the contested territory to sociocultural and ethnomethodologicalanalysis, and this leads to some proposals concerning thecharacter of the study of mind as such. I am aware that this argument is a controversial one; however, I amencouraged to pursue it because I do not believe that the cognitivists haveadequately responded to those aspects of it which have been advancedbefore, especially by Malcolm, Ryle, Cooper, Hunter, and others.(3-4)
■参照文献→“Mowgli in Babel”
 Anderson, D. C. and Sharrock, W. W. 1983, “Irony as a Methodological Theory: A Sketch of Four Sociological Variations,” Poetics Today 4(3): 565-579.
Gilbert Ryle has argued that the Cartesian mind-body dualism can create a peculiar world, in which our bodily doings are paralleled by a series of ghostly mental occurrences. In the same way, sociology can present an impression of the world of daily life as one in which our everyday doings are accompanied by a continuing flow of collateral actions through which we manage the formal conditions of stable action patterns.(573)
 Aug, Nishizaka, 1992, “The use of ‘Power’: The discursive organization of powerfulness,” Human Studies 15: 129-144.
Indeed, difficulties have been found due to treating the will as an independententity. For example, to conceptualize the will as some kind of mental state orevent which causes some (basic) actions leads to the paradox that the will mustbe postulated for the causal explanation of the action, while it must be “outside the causal system to which bodies belong” (Ryle, 1949: 65) in order for the(free) will to make sense. (144, n6)
 Coulter, Jeff, 1993, “Materialist Conceptions of Mind: A Reappraisal,” Social Research 60(1): 117-142.
 Coulter, Jeff, 1995, “The Informed Neuron: Issues in the Use of Information Theory in the Behavioral Sciences,” Minds and Machines 5:583-596.
First of all, knowledge (perceptual or otherwise) cannot be defined in terms of belief at all. Ryle once argued that "knowledge is not an elite suburb of belief" onthe following grounds: I can cease to believe that p without forgetting, whereas I cannot cease to know that p without forgetting; I can be asked how I know that pbut not how I believe that p, and ! can be asked why I believe that p but not whyI know that p.
■参照文献→“Mowgli in Babel”
 Button, G., Coulter, J., Lee, R. E., and Sharrock, W., 1995, Computers, Minds and Conduct, Polity Press.
The strategy which we adopt is to ‘rehabilitate’ Wittgenstein and Ryle in full measure, and show their continuing relevance―even their centrality ―for the contemporary disputes in the philosophy of mind. (2)
Are we then in a position to defend Ryle (his arguments, his methodology) against the charges of behaviourism? It is not, we submit, really necessary for Ryle to be defend against such charges because Ryle was not a psychological theorist of anystripe. Ryle's claims pertain not to the adequacy of ‘dispositional’ concepts as candidates for inclusion into any theory propounded under the auspices of a scientific psychology. They pertain instead to the meanings of expressions in our ordinary language and to the part which such expressions play in the kinds of explanations (and other discursive activities) we produce in the course of our daily lives.(74)
 Coulter, Jeff, 1999, “Discourse and Mind,” Human Studies 22; 163-181.
The first point to note here is that Edwards confuses an act of recounting arecollection with an "act of remembering": but there is no such thing as thelatter, as Ryle taught us over50 years ago. Remembering is not an act-verb,but akin to an achievement-verb: to remember is to be correct about whatoccurred, and as such is a 'success-verb', akin to 'winning' not to 'playing',to 'arriving' and not to 'travelling'. (168)
 Sharrock, W., and Coulter, J., 2003, “Dissolving the 'projection problem',” Visual Studies 18(1): 74-82
 Coulter, Jeff, 2004, “What is 'Discursive Psychology'?,” Human Studies 27: 335-340.
 Sharrock, W., and Coulter, J., 2004, “ToM: A Critical Commentary,” Theory & Psychology 14(5): 579-600.
Ryle's book TheConcept of Mind (1949) does not feature that title as a heading for theportrayal of any psychological system but to encompass the description ofthe grammar of the heterogeneous range of concepts—attention, understanding,intelligence, etc.—that combine into ‘the concept of mind'. Therefore,if Ryle's description of the ‘informal logic' of these concepts is(largely) correct (not something that has been extensively contested in termsof detailed specifics), then it is the language being described thatmanifests—what is in the mentalist's understanding—a behaviorist character.(583)
 Coulter, Jeff, 2005, “Language withoutMind,”Molder, H. and Potter, J. (eds.) Conversation and Cognition, Cambridge University Press.
 Coulter, Jeff, and Sharrock, Wes, 2007, Brain, Mind, and Human Behavior in Contemporary Cognitive Science: Critical Assessments of the Philosophy of Psychology, The Edwin Mellen Press.
Part of our argument,however, is that there is a need to set therecord straight in relation to the interpretations that dominant positions incontemporary philosophy make of the philosophical legacy of LudwigWittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle.
It follows that a defense of Ryle andWittgenstein against the charge of behaviorism has to consist in two parts: therejection of any reductively behaviorist construal of 'behavior' and also therejection of the displacement of 'the outer' by 'the inner'. The strategy is to rejectdualism both with respect to body and mind and with respect to 'outer' and'inner'.（xvi）
As Ryle remarked in hiscritical assessment of the Cartesian conceptualization of 'volition', the picture wasone in which 'the mind' gets its ideas (or 'intentions') translated into action viathe exercise of the 'volitional capacity', and this meant that to describe, say,someone as intentionally pulling the trigger was to state that a "mental thrust didcause the contraction of the muscles in his finger", but such a 'cause'must be a'special' sort of cause, one originating not within the mechanically physicalfunctioning of the person's body (because that would make the movement aninvoluntary one) but originating rather from within the metaphysical realm.(61)
Ryle indicated some time ago, in a much-neglected paper, that the tradition emanating from the work of Noam Chomsky characteristically treats child learning as a matter of solitary inductions governedby innate (universal-grammatical) rules.(169)
■参照文献→“Mowgli in Babel”
Ryle once asserted: “Word meanings or concepts are not proposition components but prepositional differences.” We take this to mean that the words which comprise sentences, although contributing to what they mean, are not specifiable in their syntactical nor semantic dimensions independently of whatthey are used to say in some specific context.(186)
■参照文献→“Letters and Syllables in Plato”
As Ryle observed, what can be expressed in a language is not itself a feature of alanguage alone.(187)
■参照文献→“Use, Usage and Meaning”
 Coulter, Jeff, 2008, “Twenty-five Theses against Cognitivism,” Theory, Culture & Society 25(2): 19-32.
 Jayyusi, Lena, 1984, Categorization and the Moral Order, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Crucially, thepractical activities that constitute the body ofdata are examined for their informal logic. This is ananalytically consequential point. A core analytic issue systematically becomes that of the intelligibility, in situ, of various activities and their outcomes and character for members; the structures of, and the practical production of, intelligibility are the abiding analytical concern.(2-3)
In our discussion of the use of the membership category ‘director’ in the data above,one relevant problem may belocated in the way that the concepts of ‘skill’ or ‘ability’ work. ‘Being able to do X’ is something that is displayed and ultimately ratified through the achievement of X. An ‘ability’ is taken to be demonstrable and so demonstrable through its embodiment in appropriate activity ― its practical application inperformance. It is a species of ‘knowing how’ in Ryle's terms. (40)
 Coulter, Jeff, 1989, Mind in Action, Polity Press.
 Coulter, Jeff, & Parsons, E. D., 1990, “The Praxiology of Perception: Visual Orientation and Practical Action,” Inquiry 33: 251-272.
We shall ignore, for the moment, the misunderstanding of the grammar of ‘seeing’ involved in characterizing it as any sort of 'undertaking'; since Ryle, we must acknowledge that ‘seeing’ is akin to an achievement and is not any sort of activity, process, or ‘undertaking’.(255)
 Coulter, Jeff, 1991, “Logic: ethnomethodology and the logic of language,”Button, G. (ed.,) Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences, Cambridge University Press.
 Sharrock, Wes, 2011, “The Project as an organisational Environment for the division of labour,”M. Rouncefield and P. Tolmie (eds.), Ethnomethodology at Work, Ashgate.
To use Gilbert Ryle's phraseology, the engineers tend to have a ‘thick'understanding of their part in the project division of labour. A ‘thin'understanding would be where the worker understands only his or her part in the division of labour, knows what tasks are to be done, and how to do them, ...(31)
1966 春第10講義 Pro-verbs; Performatives; Position markers; Warnings
1966 春第19講義 Appearance verbs
1967 春第17講義 Claiming possession; Emblems; Pro-terms and performatives
1967 秋第13講義 Tying-based mis-hearings; Locational tying; Pro-verbs and performatives
参照されるのは How to do things with words と『哲学論文集』の「行為遂行的発言」
 Schegloff, E. A., 1992, "Introduction," H. Sacks, Lectures on Conversation, Blackwell.
How shall we as analysts describe the terms in which participants analyze andunderstand, from moment to moment, the contextedcharacter of their lives,their current and prospective circumstances, the present moment ― how to dothis when the very terms of that understanding can be transformed by a nextbit of conduct by one of the participants (for example, a next action can recastwhat has preceded as 'having been leading up to this'). Clearly enough, thesequestions are of a radically different character than those which are brought toprominence in an undertaking like that of Searle, or Austin (1962) beforehim.(xxviii)
 Schegloff, E. A., 1992, “To Searle on Conversation: A Note in Return,”H. Parret & J. Verschueren (eds.), (On) Searle on Conversation, John Benjamins.