Durucilla Cornell's comments on temporal causality are developped in thecontexte of a critique of Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann recognizes the Parsonian point that a temporal social system can only be compared to something thatis not temporal (Luhmann: The Differntiation of Society, 1975, p.292). He even says that it can only becompared to something that is 'immediate', that is to say, timeless. But having had this insight, he then goes on to neglect its implicationsaltogether. He forgets the existance of the 'immediate' something, and argues instead that a temporal system can have nothing outside itself, and thus that there is no point against which an alternative future tothe one already containd within the present can be built.コーネルはルーマンの「現在〔＝現前的なるもの〕the present の特権化」をデリダ的な観点から批判している。
From the perspective of this argumnt, of course, that alternative point is present in the natural world. Moreover, as I imply in the text, if the 'immediate' something is the physical world, if the physical worldis also spatio-temporal, from whence does it get its temporality, if not from the social world ? Cornell criticizes Luhmann's 'priviledging of the present' from a Derridean perspective (D.Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, New York and London: Routledge, 1992).もちろん、この議論の観点からすれば、その代替的なalternative地点は 自然的世界natural world のなかに在るわけである。しかも、私が本文で暗示しているように、「直接的な」或るものとは 物理的=自然的世界physical world のことであり、また物理的=自然的世界は空間-時間的なものである、とすれば、物理的=自然的世界はその時間性を どこからfrom whence 獲得するのだろうか。社会的世界からではないのか。コーネルはルーマンの「現在〔＝現前〕the present の特権化」をデリダ的な観点から批判している。
The signification of time and space in social organizations generally, and the shift from modernism to 'postmodernism' in particular, is the central theme of Giddens (A.Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).一般的には社会的組織化における時間と空間の重要性、特殊的にはモダニズムから「ポストモダニズム」への移行、がアンソニー・ギデンズの中心的テーマである。
[......The second point about the networks constructed in relation to still points is that at the same time as they partake in the processwhereby natural reproduction is actually slowed down, they must, like thestill points themselves, have their own physical energetic effects, effectsadditional to those noted by both Lacan and Benjamin. These effects arealso physical in the sense that commodities function as points of resintance to natural rhythms so that, in reality, things get slower and slower.]
As the networks between these points extend, creating more still points in the process, the expanding spatio-temporal construction that results has apatteren of its own. There is every reason for supposing that this patternpresents itself to us an temporal causality (Cf.Cornell 1992, p.124ff.)* Temporal causality is the process whereby one thing appears to lead toanother across time in an apparently irreversible manner. This taken forgranted process is of course at issue in physics, where the asymmetrical nature of time, the puzzle as to why time only goes one way, or why time is irreversible, is regarded as something to be explained. By this account, time could be understood, in theory if not in practice, as reversible, provided that all the points of resistance out of which space-time is constructed and connected were systematically undone, and if their component natural substances re-entered the natural rhythms of production, from which they were initially, physically, 'abstracted'. This understanding of time also accords with the deconstructionist idea that causality is a construction, a line of reasoning we impose on events. Except that, by my argument, the causal construction really has been constructed. The fact that the construction has a fantasmatic origin makes it no less physical in its effects. In otherwords, to read causality as mere illusion, wihch could be done away with by refusing to impose causal reasoning in theory, accords with and therefore does nothing to counter the galloping construction of causality in the physical world.By same token, to read narrative as a mistaken imposition of a lineardiscourse on a situation whose polymorphous facticity will not brook it, is to overlook the extent to which a narrative line has been produced as a physical, material reality. That narrative owes its existance to a processin which an infantile fantasy appears to have shifted itself from the realmsof a transient moment in individual life to make itself dominant across time, but the present effects of that process are such as to make it difficult to trace the narrative.
The dynamics described in this process must be cumulative, not only in thesense that, as things get faster and faster at the level of constructedspace-time, they get slower and slower in relation to the natural logicthey attempt to rival. The dynamics must also be cumulative in terms of theextent to which the causality constructed presents itself to us an historical process.
'History', as the sense of the sequence of past events, is increasingly moulded by the extent to which a foundational psychical fantasy makes itself materially true, and by its consequent material effects on theindividual psyhces that entertain the fantasy. This is why grasping the fact that the fantasy has become a material narrative across time is so critical, if so difficult. It is critical in creating a monolithic view of history which has a material basis in the present, but which had to cover over all sorts of local differences to attain supremacy. Even so, these differences still erupt, in uncovering what the written records has not included hitherto. In this respect, scholarship, as the uncovering and correcting of what has been omited or distorted, is always anti-foundational.
As we have seen, the materialization of the narrative is also critical increating, and then undermining, the historical sense as such. The postmodern oblivion to, if not its condemnation of, history hasa predecessor.......